(below is most of a letter recently sent to a colleague and which
   was concerned with the project work)
 
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                                          Letter dated 30 Nov. 20002
  Dear XYZXYZXYZ,

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     I have been in computational work on "the current model" for some
  time now and difficulties of convergence have been and are being
  encountered.
     But it LOOKS LIKE that if there is a 3-person game where the values
  accessible to the two-play coalitions are all quite small (like, e.g.,
  of the order of 1/7 or 1/5 or less) then that the naturally found         
  equilibrium has less favored players somehow compensating quite a lot
  so that they get rather more than by Shapley value but yet less than 
  by nucleolus, since the payoffs ARE affected by these small values 
  available to two-person coalitions.
     I should clearly state that the normalization of the game is such 
  that v(1,2,3) = 1 always and  v(1) = v{2) = v(3) = 0 .
     So for WEAK separate coalitions of two players from among the three 
  the model seems to be implying something between SV and Nuc. But it is    
  closer to the "nucleolus value" of (1/3,1/3,1/3), actually.
     So far I have FAILED TO FIND any equilibrium for a symmetric game
  where players P1 and P2, together, can get 3/4 (while any other 2-player
  coal. is worthless). The mathematical set up is not adapted for the 
  possibility that one or more of the "action probabilities" should 
  actually be zero. (So it may be possible to find something appropriate   
  there by adjusting for this limitation.)
     On the other hand, it may be that this model doesn't effectively
  capture the anthropomorphic idea that any two of the players may be able,
  under appropriate favorable circumstances to "PERCEIVE" that they are
  natural allies and then to behave accordingly.
     (No equilibrium solution has been found yet for v(1,2)=3/4 but it
  LOOKS LIKE, if one is found, that players P1 and P2 will get only 
  slightly more than 3/8 each and that P3 will get only slightly less than    
  1/4! And this outcome would be giving P1 and P2 significantly less than   
  what they would get even by the nucleolus!)
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  John